EKD v. Facebook by United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
E.K.D., by her next friend MELISSA K.
DAWES, and C.M.D., by his next friend
JENNIFER E. DEYONG, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)  
)  
)  
)  
)
)
)
)
CIVIL NO. 11-461-GPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court on the motion to transfer brought by Defendant Facebook, Inc.
(“Facebook”) (Doc. 57).  Plaintiffs E.K.D., by her next friend Melissa K. Dawes, and C.M.D., by
his next friend Jennifer E. Deyong, who bring this action individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, have responded to the motion to transfer.  Having considered the matter carefully,
the Court now rules as follows.
II. BACKGROUND
According to the record of this case, Facebook operates facebook.com, a free, Internet-based
social networking site with over 153 million members in the United States; over fourteen million
facebook.com users in the United States are under the age of eighteen.  To join facebook.com, a user
must provide his or her name, age, gender, and a valid e-mail address, and click a button leading to
a message stating that “By clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that you have read and agree to”
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Facebook’s Terms of Service (“TOS”), with a hyperlink to Facebook’s TOS.  Doc. 63 at 2 ¶ 6.  Once
registered, a facebook.com user receives a “profile” page, may upload a “profile photo”of himself
or herself, and may connect with other facebook.com users by approving them as “friends.”  Also,
facebook.com allows users to share information with friends.  Users may “post” by adding text,
images, videos, and hyperlinks to their own profile page, “check-in” by announcing their
geographical location using the website’s “places” feature, and “like” content by clicking on a
thumbs-up button that appears next to certain items on the Internet, both within facebook.com and
on external sites.  When facebook.com users take one of these actions, facebook.com generates a
“story,” which appears on their friends’ “news feed.”
Facebook earns revenue primarily through the sale of targeted advertising that appears on
facebook.com users’ profile pages.  Plaintiffs challenge one of Facebook’s advertising services in
particular, known as “sponsored stories,” which Facebook launched on January 25, 2011, and which
was enabled for all facebook.com users by default.  A sponsored story is a form of paid
advertisement that appears on a facebook.com user’s profile page and that generally consists of
another friend’s name, profile picture, and an assertion that the person “likes” the advertiser. 
A sponsored story may be generated whenever a facebook.com user utilizes the website’s post, like,
or check-in features, or uses an application or plays a game that integrates with facebook.com, and
the content relates to an advertiser in some way determined by Facebook.  Thus, if a facebook.com
user clicks on the “like” button on a company’s website, the facebook.com user’s user name and
profile picture, which bears the user’s likeness, will appear on the facebook.com pages of the user’s
friends in a sponsored story advertisement stating that the user likes the company, operating in effect
as an endorsement by the facebook.com user of the company or its products and services to the
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facebook.com user’s friends.  Such sponsored story advertisements are more valuable than
standard facebook.com advertisements, and Facebook profits from selling this added value
to advertisers.
Users of facebook.com can modify the commercial use of their names and likenesses by
Facebook, but they cannot opt out of the sponsored stories feature of the website entirely. 
Specifically, Facebook’s TOS advise facebook.com users that “You can use your privacy settings
to limit how your name and profile picture may be associated with commercial, sponsored, or related
content (such as a brand you like) served or enhanced by us.  You give us permission to use your
name and profile picture in connection with that content, subject to the limits you place.”  Doc. 63-1
at 4 § 10(1).  Plaintiffs, who are minors residing in Illinois and users of facebook.com, allege that
Facebook’s practice of misappropriating their names and likenesses for commercial endorsements
without their consent violates their right of privacy under the laws of various states.  Federal subject
matter jurisdiction is proper in this case on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).   Plaintiffs seek class certification: 1
The proposed class is defined as follows:
All facebook users, who during a time that facebook records identified them to be
under the age of 18, had their name used in connection with a facebook
advertisement. (the “Class” or “Class Members”). 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek certification of a class defined as follows: 
All facebook users, who during a time that facebook records identified them to be
under the age of 18 and a resident of California, Ohio, Nevada, Illinois, or Indiana
1.     More specifically, this is a putative class action involving one hundred or more class members,
in which at least one member of the putative class is a citizen of a state different from the state of
which Facebook is a citizen, California, and in which, after aggregating the putative class members’
claims, more than $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs, is in controversy.  See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B), (d)(6).
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and had their name used in connection with a facebook advertisement. (the “Class”
or “Class Members”). 
Doc. 2 at 7 ¶ 24.  Facebook in turn has moved for transfer of this case to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to a forum-selection clause in
Facebook’s TOS.  The clause advises users of facebook.com:
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have with us
arising out of or relating to [these TOS] or Facebook exclusively in a state or federal
court located in Santa Clara County[, California].  The laws of the State of California
will govern [these TOS], as well as any claim that might arise between you and us,
without regard to conflict of law provisions.  You agree to submit to the personal
jurisdiction of the courts located in Santa Clara County, California for the purpose
of litigating all such claims.
Doc. 63-1 at 5 § 15(1).  Having set out the relevant background of this case, the Court will turn next
to the merits of Facebook’s motion for transfer of the case.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Disaffirmance of the Contract
Before reaching the issue of the forum-selection clause in Facebook’s TOS and the
enforceability of the clause, the Court first must determine whether Facebook is barred from
enforcing the forum-selection clause against Plaintiffs, who, as noted, are minors, by the doctrine
of infancy.  Certain categories of persons are held by the law to have no capacity, or only a limited
capacity, to contract:
(1) No one can be bound by contract who has not legal capacity to incur at least
voidable contractual duties.  Capacity to contract may be partial and its existence in
respect of a particular transaction may depend upon the nature of the transaction or
upon other circumstances.
(2) A natural person who manifests assent to a transaction has full legal capacity to 
incur contractual duties thereby unless he is
(a) under guardianship, or
(b) an infant, or
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(c) mentally ill or defective, or
(d) intoxicated.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 12 (1981).  The commentary to the Restatement notes that
“[h]istorically, the principal categories of natural persons having no capacity or limited capacity to
contract were married women, infants, and insane persons.”  Id. cmt. b.  The doctrine of infancy is
codified in California law.  Under that law, “minors” are all persons under eighteen years of age. 
See Cal. Fam. Code § 6500.  California law provides,
A minor cannot do any of the following:
(a) Give a delegation of power.
(b) Make a contract relating to real property or any interest therein.
(c) Make a contract relating to any personal property not in the immediate
possession or control of the minor.
Cal. Fam. Code § 6701.  The contracts enumerated in the statute are void, and no act of
disaffirmance is required to avoid them.  See Burnand v. Irigoyen, 186 P.2d 417, 419 (Cal. 1947). 
Contracts that are not void under California law are voidable, and may be disaffirmed by the minor,
either before majority or within a reasonable time thereafter.  See Cal. Fam. Code § 6710.  See also
Berg v. Traylor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (a minor may disaffirm a contract
by any act or declaration disclosing an unequivocal intent to disaffirm).  If a minor dies within the
statutory period, the minor’s heirs or personal representatives may disaffirm the contract.  See
Cal. Fam. Code § 6710.
As California law recognizes also, however, “the disability of infancy [is not] a ‘sword’
rather than a ‘shield[.]’”  Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195, 216 (Cal. 1864).  The infancy defense
may not be used inequitably to retain the benefits of a contract while reneging on the obligations
attached to that benefit.  See, e.g., MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 701 (1897) (“To say that the
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consideration paid to [a minor] . . . is not in her hands, when the money has been put into her
property in conformity with the disaffirmed contract, and notwithstanding such property is still held
and enjoyed by her, is to . . . make the privilege of infancy a sword to be used to the injury of others,
although the law intends it simply as a shield to protect the infant from injustice and wrong.”). 
Thus, “[i]f an infant enters into any contract subject to conditions or stipulations,
the minor cannot take the benefit of the contract without the burden of the conditions or
stipulations.”  5 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 9:14
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2011) (collecting cases).  California law is in accord with “the equitable
principle that minors, if they would disaffirm a contract, must disaffirm the entire contract, not just
the irksome portions.”  Holland v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 75 Cal. Rptr. 669, 672
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969).  “[N]o person, whether minor or adult, can be permitted to adopt that part of
an entire transaction which is beneficial, and reject its burdens.  This commanding principle of
justice is so well established, that it has become one of the maxims of the law . . . . [Minors] must
either accept or repudiate the entire contract,” and “they cannot retain [the contract’s] fruits and at
the same time deny its obligations.”  Peers v. McLaughlin, 26 P. 119, 120 (Cal. 1891).  “A party
cannot apply to his own use that part of the transaction which may bring to him a benefit, and
repudiate the other, which may not be to his interest to fulfill.”  Id.  “[W]hat the rules of equity
would not permit [minors] to do if they had attained their majority they cannot be permitted to
do . . . through their guardian ad litem.”  Id.  See also Simmons v. Briggs, 231 P. 604, 611
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (the recipient of a gift procured by another’s fraud cannot raise infancy
as a defense to the donor’s action to rescind, although the recipient was a minor when the gift was
executed, but retained the property after maturity).
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In the specific context of forum-selection clauses, courts, including California courts,  have
readily declined to permit minors to accept the benefits of a contract, then seek to void the contract
in an attempt to escape the consequences of a clause that does not suit them.  For example,
in Paster v. Putney Student Travel, Inc., No. CV 99-2062 RSWL, 1999 WL 1074120
(C.D. Cal. June 9, 1999), a sixteen-year-old high school student entered an agreement with a
company to spend four weeks on an Indian reservation in Montana.  See id. at *1.  A term of the
agreement provided, “I agree and consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Vermont,
with venue in Windham County, Vermont or the United States District Court for the District of
Vermont, for the resolution of all legal matters concerning this agreement or brought against Putney
Student Travel, Inc., its officers, directors, agents, servants and employees.”  Id.  The student later
brought suit against the company in California for personal injuries she allegedly suffered during her
stay on the reservation.  As to the forum-selection clause in the agreement, the student argued that
she was not bound by the agreement “because she was a minor when she signed it and has now
disaffirmed the contract by filing this action.”  Id. at *2.  The court held that the plaintiff “cannot
accept the benefits of a contract and then seek to void it in an attempt to escape the consequences
of a clause that do not suit her.”  Id.  Similarly, in Morrow v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 262
F. Supp. 2d 474 (M.D. Pa. 2002), the court ruled that a forum-selection clause contained in a contract
printed on a cruise ship passenger ticket was valid and enforceable against a passenger who alleged
that she was negligently injured aboard the cruise ship, although the passenger was a minor. 
The court said, “Plaintiff boarded the Norwegian Wind with her family and took the cruise.  Since
Plaintiff can not give back, or in any way disgorge, the benefit of her contract, it would be
inequitable to now release her from the obligations and consequences attached to that benefit.  It is
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appropriate, therefore, to hold her to the rest of the bargain and enforce the forum selection
agreement.”  Id. at 476.  See also Harden v. American Airlines, 178 F.R.D. 583, 587
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (quoting 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 43 (1964 & Supp. 2012)) (“A contract signed
by a minor is only voidable . . . . If the minor chooses benefits under the contract, he may not avoid
his obligations thereunder,” because “‘[a]n infant who asserts contractual rights is bound by
reciprocal obligations.’”).  Cf. Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965) (refusing to permit a
minor beneficiary of a health care contract between the minor’s parent and a health care group to
disaffirm an arbitration provision contained within the contract).  Plaintiffs have used and continue
to use facebook.com.  The Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot disaffirm the forum-selection
clause in Facebook’s TOS, although Plaintiffs were minors when they entered the agreement
containing the clause.
B. Validity of Facebook’s Forum-Selection Clause
Settled law holds that a mandatory forum-selection clause is “prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances.”  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).  With respect to the
unreasonableness of a forum-selection clause, 
The Supreme Court has construed this exception narrowly:  forum selection and
choice of law clauses are unreasonable (1) if their incorporation into the contract was
the result of fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining power; (2) if the
selected forum is so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the complaining party will
for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court; or (3) if enforcement of the
clauses would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is
brought, declared by statute or judicial decision.  
Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 160 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks
omitted).  See also Hugel v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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This is true even if the contract was never negotiated and in effect was dictated by one
party to the other party.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-95 (1991). 
A forum-selection clause is mandatory where its “language is obligatory” and “clearly manifests an
intent to make venue compulsory and exclusive.”  Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen
GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1992).  The clause at issue here provides, “You will resolve any
claim, cause of action or dispute . . . you have with us . . . exclusively in a state or federal court
located in Santa Clara County[, California].”  Doc. 63-1 at 5 § 15(1).  Under the clause, venue is
exclusive in a state court in Santa Clara County, or in a federal court having jurisdiction over that
county.  Because the clause makes venue compulsory and exclusive in state or federal court in
Santa Clara County, it is mandatory.  See Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d
759, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (a clause providing that “JURISDICTION AND VENUE OVER ANY
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE PROPER ONLY IN THE
FEDERAL OR STATE COURTS IN DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS” was mandatory); Continental
Ins. Co. v. M/V ORSULA, 354 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2003) (a clause providing that any suit “arising
out of the goods carried under this Bill of Lading shall, whenever the port of loading or the port of
discharge named on the face hereof is in the United States of America, be brought only in the
United States District Court having admiralty jurisdiction at the USA port of loading or USA port
of discharge, as the case may be, to the exclusion of any other Court or forum” was mandatory);
Piechur v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. 09-cv-984-JPG, 2010 WL 706047, at *3
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2010) (“By agreeing to submit to the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ in a particular forum,
the parties in this case have manifested their intent to make that venue exclusive and to exclude
venue in all other jurisdictions.”).
Page 9 of  18
Case3:12-cv-01216-JCS   Document93   Filed03/08/12   Page9 of 18
The Court turns then to the matter of the reasonableness of the forum-selection clause
contained in Facebook’s TOS.  Facebook’s TOS, including the forum-selection clause at issue, are
contained in a so-called “browsewrap agreement.”  Browsewrap agreements typically “involve a
situation where notice on a website conditions use of the site upon compliance with certain
terms or conditions, which may be included on the same page as the notice or accessible via a
hyperlink.”  Southwest Airlines v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., Civil Action No. 3: 06-CV-0891-B, 2007
WL 4823761, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007).  Thus, a party gives his or her assent simply by using
the website.  See id. (citing Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000)).
Because no affirmative action is required by the website user to agree to the terms of a contract other
than his or her use of the website, the determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends
on whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of a website’s terms and conditions. 
See id. at *5 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 477 (Dec. 2006) (“Courts
may be willing to overlook the utter absence of assent . . . when there are reasons to believe that the
website user is aware of the website owner’s terms.”) (brackets omitted).  Thus, absent a showing
of actual knowledge of the terms by the webpage user, the validity of a browsewrap contract hinges
on whether the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract.  In this instance, as
noted, persons wishing to join facebook.com must attest that they have read Facebook’s TOS, which
are made available through a hyperlink.  Also, Facebook’s TOS are hyperlinked on every page
accessed by a facebook.com user in underlined, blue text that contrasts with the white background
of the hyperlink.  Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs were reasonably put on notice of
Facebook’s TOS.  See PDC Labs., Inc. v. Hach Co., No. 09-1110, 2009 WL 2605270, at *3
(C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009) (a browsewrap agreement was sufficiently conspicuous to users of a
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website where a hyperlink to the agreement was included on multiple pages of the website in
underlined, blue, contrasting text).  Whether or not Plaintiffs actually read Facebook’s TOS is
irrelevant, of course, to the matter of the conspicuousness of the TOS and thus Plaintiffs’
constructive knowledge of the TOS, and Plaintiffs are bound by Facebook’s TOS whether Plaintiffs
read them or not.  See Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160 n.10 (“[A] party to a contract has an obligation to read
its provisions.  It is a fundamental principle of contract law that a person who signs a contract is
presumed to know its terms and consents to be bound by them.”); Paper Express, 972 F.2d at 757
(noting that “a party who agrees to terms . . . without understanding or investigating those terms does
so at his own peril”).
Second, the selected forum does not make it “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that
[Plaintiffs] will for all practical purposes be deprived of [their] day in court.”  Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Court is well aware, are sophisticated class-action attorneys who are
accustomed to litigating throughout the United States.  Anyhow, “additional expense does not
necessarily invalidate a forum-selection clause[.]”  Paper Express, 972 F.2d at 758.  “Whatever
inconvenience [Plaintiffs] would suffer by being forced to litigate in a court in [California] was
foreseeable at the time that [they] agreed to” the forum-selection clause in Facebook’s TOS.  AAR
Int’l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 526 (7th Cir. 2001).  The time for Plaintiffs to have
considered whether the forum-selection clause in Facebook’s TOS would terribly disadvantage them
was when they agreed to the TOS.  See Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 426
(7th Cir. 2007) (when signing an agreement containing a forum-selection clause, the party attempting
to evade the clause “could and no doubt did consider the potential inconvenience of litigating in
Japan, but decided to risk it,” and “is bound by its choice”); Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160 (requiring an
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American plaintiff to litigate in England as per a forum-selection clause was not unreasonable);
Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., No. 87 C 115, 1987 WL 28413, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1987)
(noting that “the cost of litigating far from home, and the loss of effectiveness which may occur
when a party is required to rely on depositions, even video depositions, rather than live testimony
to a jury” are not grounds to avoid a forum-selection clause).  In any event, Plaintiffs do not
claim that litigating in California would put them to unreasonable expense.  See Faur v. Sirius Int’l
Ins. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 650, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (if a party fails to argue that enforcement
of a forum-selection clause would cause the party financial hardship, the court may enforce
the clause).
Finally, enforcing the forum-selection clause would not contravene any strong public policy
of the State of Illinois.  In general, the public policy of Illinois is gleaned from its statutes, judicial
decisions, constitution, and the practices of its government officials.  See American Home
Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Sav.
Bank, 91 N.E. 1041, 1046 (Ill. 1910)); O’Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 537 N.E.2d
730, 734 (Ill. 1989); McClure Eng’g Assocs., Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 447 N.E.2d
400, 402 (Ill. 1983); Smith v. Board of Educ. of Oswego Cmty. High Sch. Dist., 89 N.E.2d
893, 896 (Ill. 1950); Hyatte v. Quinn, 607 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  The enforcement
of forum-selection clauses offends no public policy of Illinois.  See Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Merit
Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Calanca v. D & S Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d
21, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)) (“Under Illinois law, a forum selection clause is enforceable except in
exceptional circumstances.”); Vencor, Inc. v. Webb, 33 F.3d 840, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“Webb argues that this non-competition agreement is contrary to the fundamental public policy of
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the state of Illinois, and thus Illinois law must govern this dispute.  We disagree.  Here, both parties
elected to have the agreement governed by Kentucky law, and we discern no reason why an Illinois
court would find the agreement to be contrary to Illinois public policy.”); Cummins v. Bickel &
Brewer, No. 00 C 3703, 2001 WL 204797, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2001) (“Under Illinois law, a
choice of law clause is prima facie valid and should be enforced unless the opposing party shows that
enforcement would contravene the strong public policy of the State.”); Compass Envtl., Inc. v. Polu
Kai Servs., L.L.C., 882 N.E.2d 1149, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing Calanca, 510 N.E.2d at 23)
(the party opposing enforcement a forum-selection clause must demonstrate that “trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes
be deprived of his day in court.”).  In this case, there is no reason to believe that the policies
underpinning the state laws invoked by Plaintiffs would not be served as well by a California court
as they would be by this Court.  Enforcing the forum-selection clause in Facebook’s TOS would
cause no offense to Illinois public policy, and the Court finds that the forum-selection clause is
reasonable and enforceable.
C. Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit routinely affirms the dismissal
of lawsuits under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to forum-selection
clauses.  However, most such decisions involve clauses that designate an arbitral forum, a state-court
forum, or a foreign forum.  See, e.g., Kochert v. Adagen Med. Int'l, Inc., 491 F.3d 674, 676
(7th Cir. 2007) (the forum-selection clause at issue designated “the State Court of
Fulton County, Georgia”) (italics omitted); Abbott Labs., 476 F.3d at 422 (the forum-selection clause
at issue designated Japan); Continental Cas. Co. v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 733
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(7th Cir. 2005) (the forum-selection clause at issue designated an arbitral forum); American Patriot
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Mutual Risk Mgmt., Ltd., 364 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2004) (the forum-selection
clause at issue designated Bermuda); Paper Express, 972 F.2d at 754-55 (the forum-selection clause
at issue designated Germany).  These decisions seem sensible to the Court:  where the alternative
forum designated by a forum-selection clause is not a federal court, a case cannot be transferred
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or, assuming that venue were not otherwise proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391
or some other federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, and if dismissal were not an option, the
forum-selection clause would be meaningless.
However, where, as here, a forum-selection clause designates both a state and a federal court
as a proper forum, a court may consider whether transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.  See
In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the district court
mischaracterized the transfer as one under [28 U.S.C.] § 1406(a) when it was 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
that provided the necessary authority,” and affirming transfer under Section 1404); Salovaara v.
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is nothing . . . that precludes
a district court, faced with a Rule 12 motion based on a forum selection clause, from considering
§ 1404 factors to determine whether transfer is the better course.”) (emphasis in original); Digital
Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378-79 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (the district court
rejected the defendant’s attempt to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) because the chosen
forum was the Northern District of California and therefore the case could be transferred under
Section 1404); 5B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2011) (“Given Section 1404(a)’s
emphasis on convenience and justice, transfer, rather than the harsh remedy of dismissal, seems to
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be the better approach whenever possible.”) (collecting cases).  Here, of course, the forum-selection
clause contained in Facebook’s TOS designates the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California as a proper forum for this case, and therefore the Court will evaluate
whether transfer of this case to the Northern District of California pursuant to Section 1404
is warranted.    Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the2
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  With respect to whether the Northern District
of California is a district where this action “might have been brought” within the meaning of 
Section 1404(a), a district is one in which an action “might have been brought” if that district has: 
(1) subject matter jurisdiction over the claims; (2) personal jurisdiction over the parties; and (3) is
a proper venue.  See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960) (the district where a case “might
have been brought” for purposes of Section 1404(a) means that the plaintiff has to have had the right
to bring its case in the transferee district, which would require proper venue and personal jurisdiction
over the defendants in the transferee district).  This action could have been brought in the Northern
District of California, because Facebook resides in Santa Clara County, within the Northern District
of California, and Plaintiffs allege that Facebook’s headquarters is the location of the source of the
misconduct alleged in this case.
2.     The United States District Court for the Northern District of California is the federal district
court whose jurisdiction comprises the following California counties:  Alameda; Contra Costa;
Del Norte; Humboldt; Lake; Marin; Mendocino; Monterey; Napa; San Benito; San Francisco;
San Mateo; Santa Clara; Santa Cruz; and Sonoma.  The court, which is headquartered in
San Francisco, hears cases in its courtrooms in Eureka, Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose.  This
Court may judicially notice public records and government documents, including those available
from reliable sources on the Internet, such as the official website of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California (http://www.cand.uscourts.gov).  See Bova v. U.S. Bank,
N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.2 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (collecting cases).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a “forum-selection clause, which
represents the parties’ agreement as to the most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive
consideration . . . nor no consideration . . . , but rather the consideration for which Congress provided
in [28 U.S.C.] § 1404(a).”  Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988). 
In the Seventh Circuit, the “consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a)” has been held
to reflect the view set forth by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Stewart, namely, that “a valid
forum-selection clause is given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.” 
Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See also Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d
1286, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15) (“[A] forum-selection clause
should control unless there is a ‘strong showing that it should be set aside.’”).  According to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
[T]he signing of a valid forum selection clause is a waiver of the right to move for
a change of venue on the ground of inconvenience to the [parties].  If there is
inconvenience to some third party of which that third party may not even be aware,
or to the judicial system itself, then either party to the suit is free to move for a
change of venue.  But one who has agreed to be sued in the forum selected by the
[parties] has thereby agreed not to seek to retract his agreement by asking for a
change of venue on the basis of costs or inconvenience to himself; such an effort
would violate the duty of good faith that modern law reads into contractual
undertakings.  A party can seek to rescind a forum selection clause, . . . but if the
attempt fails and the clause is held to be valid, then section 1404(a) may not be used
to make an end run around it.
Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  The
“strong presumption” in favor of enforcing a valid forum-selection clause
can be overcome . . . only if there is inconvenience to some third party . . . or to the
judicial system itself, as distinct from inconvenience to the party seeking [to avoid
the clause].  That party’s inconvenience has no weight if the clause is valid, because
the party waived any objection based on inconvenience to it by agreeing to the clause. 
But it could not waive rights of third parties, or the interest of the federal judiciary
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in the orderly allocation of judicial business, which is why a transfer motion [to the
designated forum] can be [denied] even if there is a valid forum selection clause.
IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the inconvenience to Plaintiffs of litigating in the
Northern District of California is irrelevant under Section 1404(a).  The only basis for declining to
enforce a forum-selection clause is when transfer “would impose significant costs on third parties
or on the judicial system.”  Abbott Labs., 476 F.3d at 423.  See also IFC Credit, 437 F.3d at 613
(a forum-selection clause’s presumption of validity is overcome when “there is inconvenience to
some third party . . . or to the judicial system itself”) (quotation omitted).  Plaintiffs have identified
no non-party witnesses residing in Illinois and, if any such witnesses exist, Plaintiffs do not say what
testimony these witnesses would give.  See Moore v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
1003, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (a party seeking to avoid transfer under a forum-selection clause must
provide “affidavits or other actual evidence specifying third-party witnesses and their purported
testimony”).  In any event, Illinois non-parties are beyond the subpoena power of the Northern
District of California, so if they are called as witnesses, they will have the option of being
deposed in Illinois rather than in California; in fact, Facebook has stipulated that any witnesses, party
or non-party, residing in Illinois will be deposed in Illinois, not California, so that transferring this
case cannot impose any significant inconvenience on Illinois witnesses.  Finally, Plaintiffs offer no
plausible reason why transfer would subject the judicial system to significant costs or “interfere with
the orderly allocation of judicial business.”  Donovan, 916 F.2d at 376.  The forum-selection clause
in Facebook’s TOS will be enforced by transferring this case to the Northern District of California
under Section 1404(a).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Facebook’s motion for transfer (Doc. 57) is GRANTED.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
this action is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California for all further proceedings.  The following motions pending in this case will be carried
with the case for resolution in the transferee court:  Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim (Doc. 12); Facebook’s Motion for Judicial Notice (Doc. 15); Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Certify Class (Doc. 51); Plaintiffs’ Motion to Intervene (Doc. 90); and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Protective Order (Doc. 92).  The Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the complete file in this case
to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and to close
this Court’s file in the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:  March 8, 2012
/s/ G. Patrick Murphy             
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge
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